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Strategic management cultures: Historical connections with science 
Gerardo Abreu Pederzini 
 
Purpose – The implicit and indirect influence of classical science on strategic management has 
been of utmost importance in the development of the discipline. Classical science has underpinned 
the main and even contrasting strategic management cultures. Classical science has undoubtedly 
allowed strategic management to thrive. Nevertheless, important limitations, roadblocks and 
challenges have also been produced. This paper explores the influence of classical science on the 
main positivist and interpretive strategic management cultures.  
Design/methodologies/approach – A conceptual review is done on the influence of classical 
science on positivist and interpretive cultures in strategic management. 
Findings – The benefits and shortcomings of classical science in strategic management are 
explored and presented. Furthermore, the convoluted implicit relationship between strategic 
management and science is shown to be changing but persisting, as in order to face some of the 
challenges emerging from classical science’s influence, a complexity culture, also inspired by 
science, seems to be developing in strategic management. Complexity appears to be emerging as 
an alternative, which might allow strategic management to solve some of its current dilemmas, 
and thus, change its implicit relationship with science. 
Originality – The paper presents a novel way to conceptualize historical cultures of strategic 
management via their connection with academic cultures that have historically emerged from 
science. Through the analysis here done, a possible candidate for a Kuhninan normal strategic 
management and its potential revolution will be suggested, based on the recognition of the 
inheritance of classical science and currently complexity theory in strategic management. 
Paper Type – General review. 
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The scientific revolution changed the world in an unprecedented manner. The period from 
Copernicus and the subsequent astronomy revolution (Asimov, 1966) to the remarkable 
achievements of Newton and his Principia marked an era roughly encapsulated between the 15th 
and 18th centuries that can hardly be compared to any other (Gribbin, 2003; Hatch, 1989). The 
scientific revolution symbolized a rupture with the intellectual subordination to the church (Boisot 
and McKelvey, 2010; Thagard, 2010) and the ancient knowledge of the Greek and the Roman 
cultures (Gribbin, 2003). The consequences of the scientific revolution are manifold. However, its 
philosophy of science and method are among the most ubiquitous (Gribbin, 2003; McMillan, 
2004).  
As the scientific revolution and its philosophy of science became deeply embedded in our 
culture, they came to change and influence in unexpected ways various social sciences. From 
psychology to economics, social sciences evidence in their philosophical underpinnings and their 
theoretical and methodological structures a clear influence from the science of the scientific 
revolution (from here on classical science). Management research has not been the exception to 
this trend. Various disciplines within management have been inspired by classical science (Davis, 
2010; Rosenzweig, 2007). Particularly important is the influence on strategic management. 
Strategic management is concerned with how managers or leaders, in their aim for survival, 
growth, and competitive advantage, aim for their organizations to fit their external environments  
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(Denis et al., 2001; Freedman, 2013). Thus, one of strategic management’s core topics of study 
has been firm performance (Peteraf, 1993; Porter, 1980, 1996, 2008).  
If we consider culture as related, among many other things, to “cognitive components such 
as assumptions, beliefs, values, or perspectives” (Sackmann, 1992, p. 141), then it could be argued 
that classical science has greatly influenced various strategic management cultures, where the 
assumptions, beliefs, values and perspectives of classical science have been consciously and/or 
unconsciously followed in strategic management.  This exemplifies an intricate historical, 
sometimes overt, relationship between strategic management and classical science. In a recent 
article in the Journal of Management History, Novicevic et al. argue that “strategic management 
is an eclectic field in scholar background” (2008, p. 343). Within that vast background, in this 
review I will explore specifically the classical science background of strategic management. 
Reviewing, then, how classical science’s influence on strategic management has opened 
opportunities for successful theories, while at the same time creating threats and roadblocks for 
the development of the discipline. In exploring the historical relation between strategic 
management and classical science, I will also argue that the future of strategic management might 
lie in a reconstructed relationship with science, where classical science might come to be rejected 
in favor of complexity (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Stacey, 1995), which could fulfill Chawla et 
al.’s recent call for theoretical perspectives that “incorporate complex constructs of environmental 
uncertainty within their frameworks while being responsible for the key assumptions being made 
about the nature of knowledge” (2012, p. 215).  In sum, in this paper I will portray the historical 
evolution of strategic management, as presumably trapped in convoluted implicit relationships 
with science and the dichotomy of their classical and complexity traditions. Additionally, the paper 
will end by arguing for a possible Kuhnian conceptualization of strategic management cultures.   
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Classical Science 
First, let us explore why and how classical science came to be such a success, so that an adequate 
understanding of its legacy to economics, business studies and particularly strategic management 
can be produced. 
The unmatched success of classical science can be explained by several factors. First of 
all, classical science evolved as a result of the tools that it developed, ranging from the practical 
such as the telescope or the microscope (Gribbin, 2003; Thagard, 2010), to the theoretical, such as 
Newton’s/Leibnitz’s development of calculus (Westfall, 1993). Second, a mathematical ethos 
emerged, particularly in disciplines such as physics, where it was acknowledged that the laws of 
nature could/should be explained in mathematical language. A third and key element is thinking 
in terms of cause and effect. By counterfactual arguing, X would be said to have caused Y, in the 
case that “if X had not happened, then Y would not have happened” (Sloman and Lagnado, 2015, 
p. 225). Determining causes is a hard, controversial and problematic process. Classically, three 
conditions tend to be argued for a causal relation between X and Y: “evidence of concomitant 
variation, time-ordering, and elimination of alternative explanations” (Highhouse, 2009, p. 554), 
where overruling alternative explanations tends to be the hardest condition to satisfy. 
Experimentation is a fourth important element of classical science, where experiments became 
vehicles to understand causal relations. An experiment describes “the consequences attributable to 
deliberately varying a treatment” (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 9). In classical science it was 
acknowledged that to discard alternative explanations, experiments must vary an independent 
variable(s) to observe its influence on a dependent variable(s) (Thagard, 2010), while holding 
everything else constant (i.e. ceteris paribus) (Davis, 2010; Highhouse, 2009; Shadish et al., 
2002). Ceteris paribus (Persky, 1990) is essential to understand classical science. For example, it 
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is easier to argue that temperature variance causes volume change in a gas, if the gas changes its 
volume when heated while everything else remains constant. However, if the volume of the gas is 
heated when the mass and pressure are varying too, then it turns considerably more difficult to 
isolate which and in what proportion was the cause of the measured effect. Experimentation is a 
paradigmatic example of how classical science evolved through reductionism, a fifth important 
factor in classical science. Classical science reduces phenomena in various ways, of which, for 
example, experiments reduce or simplify observations and measurements by studying causal 
relations under controlled conditions. More importantly, classical science’s reductionism is 
expressed in its belief that if “one can understand the parts of a system, one can understand the 
whole” (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 393). This derives in the clockwork model of the universe, 
where the universe could be understood as a collection of individual components which 
aggregation is compositional: they “maintain the same form in aggregate systems that existed at 
lower levels” (Lord et al., 2011, p. 108). In short, in reductionism all causal arrows point 
downwards. The assumption therefore would be that, for instance, “A machine is built up from 
distinct parts and can be reduced to those parts” (Mikulecky, 2001, p. 342). This ontology is 
referred to as atomistic (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010). 
 The success or failure of classical science and its theories was assessed by various norms. 
The first one is prediction, where classical science particularly excelled in its capacity to predict 
the phenomena it studied (Allen and Boulton, 2011; Thagard, 2010). Other important standards 
were repeatability and replicability (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010; Gribbin, 2003). The outputs of 
classical science are lawlike statements. The scientist of the scientific revolution believed that there 
existed immutable laws of nature, which external validity was assumed to be all encompassing, an 
example being Newton’s three fundamental laws of motion (Gribbin, 2003; Mikulecky, 2001). A 
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final important way to assess or discriminate among theories was parsimony. It was simply 
assumed that “A hallmark of good theory is parsimony” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547). The latter was 
best captured by Occam’s Razor, meaning the presumption that ceteris paribus, simpler 
explanations are more likely to be right and are preferred (Baker, 2004). 
 As classical science evolved, the precision of predictions came to be challenged, where 
precise prediction or description was made impossible in certain phenomena that started to be 
observed. With the advent of statistical mechanics the idea was introduced of using probabilistic 
reasoning instead of aiming at full precision (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010; Lyotard, 1979; Staley, 
2005). Thus, the dynamics of a system started to be studied as the statistical behaviors of its 
constituent elements, where variance was usually interpreted as error or noise (Allen and Boulton, 
2011). The introduction of probabilistic thinking in physics symbolized a break from the exact and 
deterministic thinking that predated it, and it introduced the possibility of epistemological limits. 
The latter was later on best captured, for example, by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which in 
the realm of quantum mechanics (i.e. the physics of the very small) states “that certain pairs of 
quantum properties… can never both be precisely defined at the same time” (Gribbin, 2003, p. 
938; Lyotard, 1979).  
 In summary, classical science represents a way of encoding natural systems to produce 
theories in the language of mathematics, which based on experimentation, reductionism, causality, 
and parsimony predict either exactly or probabilistically the evolution of dynamic systems (Allen 
and Boulton, 2011; Boisot and McKelvey, 2010; Ghoshal, 2005; Gribbin, 2003; McMillan, 2004; 
Mikulecky, 2001; Staley, 2005). Classical science is an expression of modernism -of a progressive 
ethos-, as “the focus is on a phenomenal world directly and unproblematically observed” and 
understood (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010, p. 415). Most of our current science and its technology 
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are the result of classical science, and thus its “success cannot be ignored” (Mikulecky, 2001, p. 
343). 
 
From Classical Science to Strategic Management 
Let us now look at strategic management, so its connection with classical science is illustrated. 
The history of the strategic management discipline is intricate. The concept of strategy comes from 
ancient Greek, Chinese and European backgrounds (Thomas et al., 2013). Sun Tzu’s The Art of 
War (2000), presumably dating from 500 BCE, evidences some of the historical origins of the 
concept, as Machiavelli’s The Prince (1515) among others (e.g. Clausewitz) do too. And thus, 
strategy is largely a military and/or political concept, which did not see its incursion into 
management until the 20th century. Allegedly, one could point to von Neumann’s revolutionary 
work on game theory, first published in the late 1920s followed by his and Morgenstern’s book in 
1944 (Nowak, 2012), as introducing competitive -strategic- thinking to social forms of 
organization. Moreover, the thrust for strategic thinking was largely fueled by practitioners too, 
given the novel challenges they were facing as organizations and markets expanded. An example 
of the latter would be the popular spreading of the multidivisional organizational structure, best 
known as the M-form (Miles and Snow, 1984). Academically, before and certainly by the 1950s, 
there were traces of strategic management already, especially encapsulated back then in the related 
concept and discipline of business policy, which “taught students to question whether a firm's 
strategy matched its competitive environment” (Ghemawat, 2002, p. 40). The 1950s and 60s saw 
the emergence of some of the first books relating explicitly or implicitly to strategic management; 
for example, Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959) or Ansoff’s Corporate 
Strategy (1965). However, Freedman in his monumental history of strategy, acknowledges 
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Chandler’s Strategy and Structure (1962) as the cornerstone in bringing strategy into management: 
“it was Chandler who gave the concept of strategy prominence in a business setting” (2013, p. 
496).  
Subsequently a culture evolved in strategic management, which believes strategy is about 
planning, control, long-term goals, finding the most optimum ways to reach goals, and a tool to 
manage in deterministic ways an organization. This was boosted by the continued influence of 
economics and quantitative methodologies. Game theory is an example of the latter (Teece et al., 
1997), as well as it is the industrial organization economics school. The latter presumably began 
with Bain, who uncovered “the general relation between industry structure and performance” 
(Ghemawat, 2002, p. 53). Eventually, this approach was epitomized in the 1970s and 80s by 
Porter’s work on industry forces affecting performance (1980), as well as Hunt’s introduction of 
the concept of strategic groups (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; McGee and Thomas, 1986). Another 
important revolution of the 1980s was the resource based view, which in its modern form emerged 
from the works of people like Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991), who revived Penrose’s focus 
on internal organizational factors, although this time hugely influenced by the ethos of economics 
quantitative methodologies, and a positivist approach.  
Important events, including the oil shocks of the 70s (Centeno and Cohen, 2012), 
challenged the idea that strategy could actually plan, control or predict. Scholars like Mintzberg 
came to argue for the serendipitous essence of strategizing, as well as the importance of the people 
and processes of strategic management (1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Additionally, the 
classic debate emerged on whether to focus on studying the content of strategies or the process 
and the people that produce it (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). Therefore, in parallel another culture 
has for long existed beyond the one influenced by economics and positivism. An early example of 
Journal of Management History 0(0) 
 
  9 
 
the latter would be Pettigrew’s work on sociopolitical processes and strategy (1973; 1977), plus 
other efforts that emerged to consider the role of cognition in strategizing (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992). These more human or socially centered approaches were aided by the early and 
historical works from Cyert and March (Lockett and Wild, 2014) as well as Simon’s later concept 
of bounded rationality (1991). Eventually, other social approaches arose, including strategy as 
practice, where arguably Johnson et al.’s 2003 paper on the topic was a cornerstone. In the strategy 
as practice tradition, strategy “is not something that an organization has but something its members 
do” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). Other related efforts in this alternative strategic management 
culture, include strategy as discourse (Langley and Abdallah, 2011; Hardy and Thomas, 2014), 
where strategy, in a Foucaultian way, is conceived through the communicative interactions that 
form it. These human centred, interpretive approaches have also differed from positivist ones in 
their methodologies, as more qualitative, case method, and ethnographic approaches have been 
usually followed. 
 This brief historical account is just that: a very short summary. There are many other things 
that have happened in the development of the discipline (e.g. transaction cost analysis, population 
ecology, or agency theory). Nevertheless, this account evidences the multi-faceted structure and 
essence of the discipline, which as Hoskisson et al. argue the history of the field could be seen as 
swings of a pendulum, where “each pendulum swing has taken us to new theoritcal paradigms and 
metholodogically approaches” (1999, p. 447). Largely and very roughly, one could say that the 
various faces of strategic management could be enpsulated in two broad cultures, each with their 
own beliefs, values, and specfic ramifications and specializations. One heavily influenced by 
economics, quantitative methodologies, positivism, rationality assumptions, and a focus on 
industry dynamics and/or the reductive role of core assetts. Let us call this the positivist culture. 
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The second one has differed by looking at the interpretive social and human side of strategy either 
at the industry or more usually organization level, where qualitative methods have been arguably 
favored. Let us call this the interpretive culture. Using these two cultures definitely oversimplifies 
the discipline, as there are certainly exceptions, as well as subcultures within each. However, this 
rough categorization could be helpful in order to explore the influence of classical science on 
strategic management. More importantly, what I will discuss and show in this section, is how by 
analyzing with detail the positivisit and interpretive cultures, both will be reavealed as having been 
similarly and greatly influenced by classical science. 
The success of classical science was of such magnitude that its culture (i.e. its paradigm 
values, norms, and beliefs) were inherited by most of the social sciences, including both the 
positivist and interpretive cultures of strategic management (Allen and Boulton, 2011; Ghoshal, 
2005; McMillan, 2004). Thus, economics and subsequently strategic management research have 
shown a “propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful 
physical sciences” (Hayek, 1974, p. 1), despite the fact that the phenomenon of interest might be 
significantly different (Ghoshal, 2005; Hayek, 1974). This mimetic process has opened many 
opportunities for strategic management, as it has provided it with outstanding developments. 
However, such replication of classical science in strategic management has also generated 
important threats, challenges and roadblocks. In the positivist culture of strategic management, the 
embracement of classical science is evidently expressed in its philosophical foundation on 
positivism (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010), and its more recent variation, post-positivism (Bryman, 
1984, 2012; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Burrell amd Morgan, 2005; Gephart, 2004; Williams, 2006; 
Willig, 2001): 
Positivism and postpositivism adopt the stance of realism and rely on the assumption of an objective world 
external to the mind that is mirrored by scientific data and theories. Positivism and postpositivism are efforts 
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to uncover truth or true reality. Postpositivism… differs from positivism in holding that reality can be known 
only probabilistically (Gephart, 2004, p. 456). 
 
Thus, between positivism and postpositivism both the deterministic and the probabilistic modes of 
classical science are covered. Positivism has driven mainly a culture of quantitative research in 
strategic management, generating theories frequently characterized by “a few causally related 
variables in which there is little evidence of human action” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007, p. 7). And 
even though the history of strategic management might be characterized by parallel swings 
(Hoskisson et al., 1999; Henisz, 2011) between the interpretive human-inclusive culture and the 
positivist reductive one, it has been the latter which has probably thrived more intensively.  
 The positivist culture in strategic management has amassed significant influence. An 
important example of a classical science strategy theory in the positivist culture, would be the 
aforementioned industrial organization economics and its structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, which “put the determinants of firm performance outside the firm, in its industry’s 
structure” (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010, p. 350). As previously argued, this theory is best portrayed 
by Porter’s forces framework (1980, 2008; Teece et al., 1997), where five forces, including threat 
of new entrants, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitutes, 
and rivalry, determine profitability. In other words, “If the forces are intense… almost no company 
earns attractive returns on investment. If the forces are benign…. many companies are profitable” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 80). The latter is certainly reflective of classical science, as it proposes a 
parsimonious reductive framework in which certain forces pressure -as in physics- firms that are 
subject to their effect in a given industry. The structure-conduct-paradigm turned out to be just a 
partial explanation of firm profitability, and came under criticism as it became evident that industry 
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structure was only a piece of the equation (see, for example, Rumelt (1991), or Quigley and 
Hambrick (2015)). 
 Another classical science strategy theory in the positivist culture, would be the resource 
based view (RBV), especially in its post 1980s conception (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 
1989a, 1989b; Lockett and Wild, 2014; Wernerfelt, 1984). The RBV explains “competitive 
heterogeneity based on the premise that close competitors differ in their resources and capabilities” 
(Peteraf, 1993, p. 997; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barreto, 2010; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Teece, 2007). Particularly, the RBV argues that “Resources contribute to… performance 
advantages to the extent that they are valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and non-substitutable” 
(Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007, p. 961; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008; Pablo et al., 2007). The RBV is certainly consistent with classical science. First of all, it 
proposes a reductive causal relation between resources -cause- and firm performance -effect 
(Hoskisson et al., 1999; Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010; Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999). Second, the 
RBV is reflexive of classical science’s prediction aim, as it predicts that firms with resources with 
certain attributes will have better performance (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995). Third, its claim of valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources 
bestowing competitive advantage basically meets the “criterion for lawlike generalizations” 
(Priem and Butler, 2001, p. 27).  Later on, an extension of the RBV, dynamic capabilities, emerged 
to help explain how resources might be re-bundled, reconfigured, updated or upgraded in order to 
keep up with changing environments. A dynamic capability is, therefore, “a firm’s ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2009; Makadok, 2001). Thus, the introduction of dynamic capabilities 
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brought together an almost Newtonian motion modelling of the trajectories of firms’ performances. 
The RBV has been subject to criticism too, especially because it says little about how resources 
impact performance, hence marginalizing human activity within organizations (Johnson et al., 
2003). Particularly, the post 1980s RBV ignores the role of managers (Foss and Ishikawa, 2007; 
Foss et al., 2008), who are key in explaining firm performance, and whose role in strategizing is 
central to conceive strategy as a human or human-led process (Helfat and Peteraf, 2014; Quigley 
and Hambrick, 2015). Thus, an alternative approach in the interpretive culture exists that tries to 
revive Penrose’s (1959; Foss et al., 2008) original consideration of managers and their subjectivity. 
In this type of works, the RBV considers more deeply the role of managers (see, for example,  
Sirmon (2011), Sirmon (2007), Chadwick (2014), Ambrosini (2009), Eggers and Kaplan (2013), 
and Holcomb (2009), among others). 
 At the end of the day, most positivist classical science inspired strategic management 
theories have tended to be critiziced for their incompleteness, particularly their dehumanization of 
strategy. Another important critique is that experimentation, contrary to classical science, is 
difficult to do in strategic management (Davis, 2010; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006; Rosenzweig, 2007). 
More importantly, even if strategic management phenomena could be isolated to test the effect of 
the variance of one variable, ceteris paribus, on another one, experiments might still be largely 
limited, since they would have little ecological validity (Willig, 2001). The latter might happen as 
rarely in situ one variable moves as everything else remains equal. Therefore, a different approach 
is needed that instead of aiming at understanding variables in isolation (or under controlled 
conditions) it explores variables in interaction. In addition, quantitative methods, such as statistical 
analyses of surveys or secondary financial data, which might control “stastically for alternative 
explanations” (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006, p. 72), could also face other challenges. One, for instance, 
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is the well recorded phenomenon of unethical accounting and financial data manipulation by 
executives (Ghoshal, 2005; Henisz, 2011; Mintzberg et al., 2002). Other challenges exist in the 
case of surveys, such as common method variance (Spector, 2006), and more broadly the risk of 
researchers’ bias and the pre-study probability that a tested relationship is false (Ioannidis, 2005). 
Other limitations arise from context. If knowledge is derived in a given context, will it be valid in 
another one? (Syed et al., 2010). For example, Wal-Mart’s presumably well-understood and 
successful USA model, turned out to be a failure when deployed in the German context  
(Christopherson, 2007). Beyond this mundane arguments there exist the philosophical ones as 
well. For instance, classical science’s belief on immutable laws might be inadequate in strategic 
management. Imagine hypothetically that strategic management knowledge is internally and 
externally valid, such that, for example, the RBV’s lawlike claims hold true in every context 
unquestionably. How do we know such knowledge will remain valid in 100, 1000, 1 000 000, or 
a billion years? Actually, chances are it will not, or as Hume more elegantly put it:  
all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that 
similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of 
nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can 
give rise to no inference or conclusion (1910, Section IV, pt. 2, para. 8; Davis, 2010).  
 
An example of the latter would be the question in strategic management on how much CEOs 
explain firm performance, where for instance in  Quigley and Hambrick’s (2015) study, the answer 
basically depends on when you are asking, since the CEO effect widely varied throughout their 
explored periods.  
 The interpretive culture in strategic management, provides a different approach from a 
different epistemology: interpretivism. An interpretive epistemology (Bryman, 2012; Bryman and 
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Bell, 2007; Burrell and Morgan, 2005; Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Schwandt, 2007) aims “to 
understand the actual production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings. 
A relativist stance is adopted such that diverse meanings are assumed to exist and to influence how 
people understand and respond to the objective world” (Gephart, 2004, p. 457). The interpretive 
culture in strategic management is an important step in the direction to accept and define strategic 
management as a human science. The latter is accomplished by embracing meaning, which is one 
of the key features (Merton, 1936) in which social phenomena differs from that of the natural 
sciences (Ghoshal, 2005; Hayek, 1974). “Strategy in the interpretive model might be defined as 
orienting… frames of reference that allow the organization and its environment to be understood 
by organizational stakeholders” (Chaffee, 1985, p. 93). This conceptualization on strategy has 
derived in many remarkable efforts to try to understand, for example, how a managers’ cognition 
affects the strategizing process (Barr et al., 1992; Bogner and Barr, 2000; Eggers and Kaplan, 
2013; Kaplan, 2011), or how the convergence of multiple cognitive frameworks in an organization 
might produce political processes that also affect strategy (Bradshaw-Camball and Murray, 1991; 
Pettigrew, 1973). However, interpretive strategic management has also been greatly influenced by 
classical science, which on the one hand, has allowed it to evolve and develop, but on the other , it 
has also generated important threats and roadblocks. First of all, interpretive strategic management 
has sometimes embraced classical science’s reductionism. Consider, for instance, Hardy and 
Thomas’ exploration of a “telecommunications company… Employing over 100,000 people and 
operating in over 100 countries, GlobalTel was one of the world’s biggest suppliers of mobile 
phones” (2014, p. 326). Their paper certainly provides unique insight into the strategy as discourse 
school in the interpretive culture (Langley and Abdallah, 2011). Nonetheless, their strategy as 
discourse exploration  is still considerably reductive, as for example, it simplifies such a colossal 
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conglomerate to only a couple dozens of pages, and more importantly, it conceives strategy as 
generated barely by a couple of underpinning discourses. Such reductive processes are not 
uncommon, and given practical limitations, some argue they may be unavoidable.  
Another challenge in the interpretive strategic management culture is that of method. In 
order to be able to explore meaning, many interpretive works are rightly done through qualitative 
methodologies. Yet the challenge of qualitative methodologies is that they are generally carried 
under uncontrolled conditions. Thus, at the same time that the researcher explores a specific 
variable, many others continue moving. Therefore, as Allen et al. argue, under uncontrolled 
conditions “all the different disciplines and domains of ‘knowledge’ will interact through reality—
and so actions [and research] based on any particular domain of knowledge, although seemingly 
rational and consistent, will necessarily be inadequate” (2007, p. 403).  Hence, one should expect 
interpretive theories to be holistic and pluralistic, being aware of all the plethora of variables that 
might be influencing them. Yet we usually see interpretive strategy expressed in the same reductive 
narrowed focus approach of classical science. This is illustrated, for instance, in the literature 
reviews of interpretive papers, which generally focus on one or at most a couple of specific types 
of literature, automatically ignoring others that could be relevant and needed since the work was 
done under uncontrolled conditions. For example, Danneels’ analysis of Smith Corona does 
provide a novel interpretive conceptualization of the RBV by combining dynamic capabilities 
literature with others such as cognition and marketing (2011). Nonetheless, this still necessarily 
ignores many other types of literatures, such as those on strategy and emotions, politics, 
economics, social conditions, or stakeholders, which given the uncontrolled conditions of the study 
might have been relevant.  
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Reductionism -and its requested narrow focus- is one of the possible legacies of classical 
science in interpretive strategic management. Another important legacy is the aspiration for 
lawlike statements, which given the usual lack of experimental controlled conditions in qualitative 
research, might be an inadequate aim. Let us go back to Danneels’ (2011) whose interesting paper 
is a good example of an interpretive approach to the RBV. Danneels’ exploration of Smith Corona 
is done mainly through an in-depth historical case study based on documents, company products, 
archival data and qualitative interviews. The paper states that “how and to what extent dynamic 
capability is exercised depends on executives’ cognitions about their firm’s resources” (2011, p. 
21). This sounds reasonable; however, the main question that arises here is: how valid is it, for a 
mainly qualitative research project that did not control for the plethora of interacting variables (i.e. 
no ceteris paribus), to make such a classical science type of deterministic causal claim? Let us 
now look at Kaplan’s (2008) engaging exploration on framing contests in strategy development 
processes. The paper “relied heavily on observations of everyday activities, using other sources of 
data—such as interviews and documents—to amplify and verify insights” (Kaplan, 2008, p. 733). 
This paper analyzes the interplay between cognition and politics in the process of strategy 
development. However, in this research carried under uncontrolled conditions (i.e. no ceteris 
paribus) some inevitable restlessness arises when one reads classical science type of claims, such 
as “I find that frames influence strategic choices, not in a deterministic fashion, but rather in one 
mediated by organizational framing contests” (Kaplan, 2008, p. 745). 
As shown through the interpretive papers and theories used as examples, it seems that 
interpretive strategic management might reject classical science’s epistemology; however, it might 
have not fully rejected classical science’s atomistic ontology (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010). As it 
was illustrated with the examples of strategy as discourse (e.g. (Hardy and Thomas, 2014)), the 
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interpretive RBV (e.g. (Danneels, 2011)), or cognition, politics and strategy (e.g. (Kaplan, 2008)) 
interpretivist alternatives to positivist conceptions of strategy have (sometimes) continued 
following classical science, including reductionism. Furthermore, it seems that interpretive studies 
might not necessarily have rejected classical science’s modernism, as it was seen that at least some 
interpretative studies are still aiming, somehow, at lawlike statements, as if the phenomena of 
interest could be fully known or mastered. I should emphasize that both interpretive and positivist 
strategic management cultures, through their classical science inheritance, have certainly made 
highly valuable contributions to our understanding of strategic management. This is true for all the 
papers I have analyzed. However, as my overview of these works has shown, roadblocks have also 
emerged. For example, I have argued that given the lack of experimental conditions and the 
difficulty to explore meaning and human doing in strategy, it is probably not fully adequate or 
appropriate to continue following classical science. Thus, the discussion here presented, evidences 
that strategic management has been historically entrapped by classical science inspired cultures, 
where the “Adoption of scientific methods has undoubtedly yielded some significant benefits for 
both our research and our pedagogy, but the costs too have been high” (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 77). 
 
Beyond Classical Science in Strategic Management? 
Given the difference in types of phenomena, it is not only the methodologies of classical science 
that might need to be rejected, but also its overall culture based on prediction, control, 
reductionism, and immutable lawlike causal claims (Allen and Boulton, 2011; Marion and Uhl-
Bien, 2001; McMillan, 2004). The question has, thus, existed for many researchers in the past and 
currently, on how should strategic management be re-conceptualized. How could a new culture 
emerge in strategic management which detaches itself from classical science? Unfortunately, there 
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are not definitive answers. While some continue emphasizing the positivist strategy culture, others 
have kept arguing for interpretive strategic management, yet perhaps where better possibilities 
exist is in complexity.  
Complexity theory explores systems made of interacting and interdependent parts 
(Holland, 2014; McMillan, 2004). In a complex system a plethora of interacting elements produce 
a system that is nonlinear, where the whole that emerges is not the mere sum of the parts (Lord et 
al., 2011; Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Thus, a peculiar yet truly important 
feature of complex systems is that of emergence, where in certain conditions the whole can, for 
example, self-organize (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009). Feedback networks are especially 
important in complex systems, where the output of an element could get recycled through the 
intricate networks to come back as a distorted input to influence again the original element (Stacey, 
1995). This sometimes produces particular events in complex systems, such as when signals get 
amplified through the feedback networks producing then infrequent and radical events that could 
affect or sometimes even collapse the system (Anderson, 1999; Boisot and McKelvey, 2010; 
Holland, 2014). Moreover, complex systems are paradoxical, they are always changing, and yet 
their states might usually fall within a limited region (i.e. an attractor) of their state-space 
(Anderson, 1999; McMillan, 2004). In short, complex systems are likely to exhibit the property of 
chaos in some region of their state-space. Chaos simply means that the nonlinear system is still 
deterministic (i.e. its past still defines its future), while nonetheless, being sensitive to even tiny 
variations in its conditions that can derive in unexpected, yet sometimes restricted, divergences 
(Smith, 2007). Particularly important to strategic management are complex adaptive systems, 
which are characterized for their capacity to conceptualize their environments in order to learn 
about them and hopefully adapt to them (Holland, 2014; Mikulecky, 2001; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). 
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Given the intricate networks of multiple interacting elements, complex adaptive systems can be 
difficult to understand, with cause and effect relationships getting blurred (Stacey, 1995). 
Particularly important for complex systems is Absby’s principle or the principle of requisite  
variety, which states that “The adaptive capacity of complex systems is thought to depend on the 
match between internal complexity in an organization and the complexity of its environment”  
(Lord et al., 2011, p. 105). In sum, complexity theory challenges classical science in various ways. 
 Recently, complexity has opened up a new door for strategic management. From a 
complexity perspective, organizations come to be seen as possible complex adaptive systems 
(Anderson, 1999; Stacey, 1995), which therefore demands a re-conceptualization of strategy and 
strategic management. First of all, organizations, as possible complex adaptive systems  
(McMillan, 2004), are conceived as looking to climb “uphill toward higher fitness” (Anderson, 
1999, p. 224). Here fitness has to do with both survival and growth, and probably with the Holy 
Grail of competitive advantage too (Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007; Ghemawat, 1986). In other 
words, fitness in strategic management relates to competitive advantage, especially a sustained one 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 2005; Miles and Snow, 1984). After all, if organizations are aggregates of 
biological entities (i.e. human beings) it sounds plausible that beyond mere survival and growth, 
they aim to become dominant (Wilson, 2014), in spite of how impossible or ephemeral that might 
be. Consistent with Ashby’s principle, organizations continuously morph (Rindova and Kotha, 
2001; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007), in efforts to link with their environments and to mirror their 
complexity. Strategy from a complexity perspective, therefore, is precisely what emerges 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) from that process or pattern of environmental 
adaptation. Thus, in strategy theories inspired by complexity, strategy is seen as the result of “an 
endless series of organizational microstates that emerge from local interactions among agents 
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trying to improve their local payoffs” (Anderson, 1999). Hence, strategy in strategic management 
becomes the emergent organizational response to “the demands of survival in a harsh physical 
environment” (Freedman, 2013, p. 5). 
 This conception of strategy leads to the classic debate on whether strategy is bottom up or 
top down (Hart, 1992). Certainly, for example, bottom up activities, such as the “autonomous 
strategic initiatives of individuals at the operational levels” (Burgelman, 1983, p. 241; Noda and 
Bower, 1996), influence and define strategy. However, the importance of top down processes 
cannot be denied either. In spite of the disparate and changing evidence (Helfat and Peteraf, 2014; 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2015), top management does probably have an important impact and 
influence on strategy and firms’ performances (Hambrick, 2007; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002). 
Such influence might sometimes be properly planned, although is rarely purely rational  (Bailey et 
al., 2000; Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). More importantly, planned strategies usually are merely the 
result of looking for a “response to specific problems or opportunities and consider but few 
potential alternatives” (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007, p. 424). Or, in Lindblom’s (1959) terms, 
sometimes top managers barely muddle through. Thus, there are both top down and bottom up 
processes shaping strategy, and additionally when these two meet, convoluted interactions happen, 
such as organizational politics (Bradshaw-Camball and Murray, 1991; Buchanan and Dawson, 
2007; McDermott et al., 2013; Pye and Pettigrew, 2006), among a myriad of other affecting factors 
that further complexify what can only be described as a difficult to simplify strategizing process. 
Therefore, complexity is forming a new culture in strategic management, where strategy is 
whatever emerges from the resulting interactions of such convoluted bottom-up and top-down 
processes. Let us call this the complexity culture.  
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 Some important empirical papers have started to work with complexity re-
conceptualizations of strategy. It could be argued that works as classic as those from Mintzberg 
(1978; 1985) and his argument for realized and emergent strategies as well as other strategy as 
practice research (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Langley and Abdallah, 2011) might already relate 
somehow to the culture of complexity. Other works more explicitly invoke complexity, such as 
Orton’s (2000) exploration of the reorganization of the United States’ intelligence service, which 
he portrays as messy strategizing with unintended consequences, where causal relationships get 
blurred and intentions lost. Another illustrative work is, for example, Browne and Eisehardt’s The 
Art of Continuous Change (1997, p. 1), which promotes the idea that organizations that thrive in 
hostile environments may be characterized “by remaining at the poetically termed "edge of chaos" 
that exists between order and disorder” (1997, p. 29). Another example would be MacKay and 
Chia’s (2013) exploration of a Canadian automotive company. Basically, the strategy that took 
this company to its demise was probably the result of countless interacting factors, both internal 
and external. Regarding this plethora of interacting factors, managers in the company were 
sometimes able to do something to adapt to them; however, more generally managers’ decisions 
tended to be incomplete and with unintended consequences, which ended up shaping an 
unexpected and undesired destiny.  
The complexity culture in strategic management would be more holistic than simplistic 
and reductive. Thus, complexity’s holistic approach might come to illustrate van Baalen and 
Karsten’s claim that the “Incompleteness of disciplinary solutions will be corrected by new 
emerging inter-disciplines” (2012, p. 233). However, the complexity culture in strategic 
management has not seen many empirical papers as it would be needed in order to understand 
what its methods will be and whether these could correct the limitations of the influence of classical 
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science on the positivist and interpretive cultures of strategic management. Some papers like the 
one by Brown and Eisenhardt or the one by MacKay and Chia still use standard methodologies. 
For example, MacKay and Chia used an inductive approach based on semi-structured interviews. 
Thus, questions may still arise about whether or not these are enough. Nevertheless, such possible 
challenges might be solved with the shift in the underpinning science. One of the problems with 
classical science in the positivist and interpretive cultures of strategic management is that in spite 
of the differences in phenomena of interest, sometimes we still try to aim for the same outcomes 
of classical physics, especially accurate and full understanding and prediction. Nevertheless, 
complexity’s culture acknowledges that if organizations are complex adaptive systems then cause 
and effect become blurred and difficult to distinguish. Therefore, the methods might remain, at 
least until now, the same but their values and aspirations have changed. In the classical science 
influenced positivist and interpretive cultures of strategic management, the parsimonious 
theorization was valued and accurate prediction was aspired, whereas in the complexity culture 
requisite theorization is valued (i.e. theory that mirrors the complexity of the phenomena it 
studies). And, more importantly, “Anticipation rather than prediction is, then, the best that we can 
hope for” (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010, p. 424). Table 1 offers a summary of the influence of 
science (i.e. classical science and complexity) on the cultures of strategic management (i.e. 
positivist, interpretive and complexity).  
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Strategic Management Cultures 
 Positivist Culture Interpretive Culture Complexity Culture 
Influence 
from 
Science 
Influenced by classical science. Its 
philosophical foundations acknowledge 
classical science’s realism and objectivism, 
where theories allegedly mirror reality. 
There is a significant quantitative ethos. As 
in classical science, causal thinking governs 
the theories here. Following classical 
science’s beliefs, we see efforts to construct 
lawlike -perhaps immutable- theories, like 
the RBV’s generalization on which types of 
resources are important. In the spirit of 
classical science, there are some efforts done 
to track the trajectories of strategies in their 
state-space. This culture has been influenced 
by economics and rationality assumptions, 
although as always exceptions exist. Given 
important obstacles for experimentation in 
strategic research, experimentation is 
usually substituted for other types of 
statistical methodologies. Reductionism 
plays a key role here, where systems are still 
disintegrated into their parts (i.e. 
ontologically atomistic), as in the RBV. 
Differs from the positivist one, as it partially 
rejects realism and objectivism. Here 
subjectivism is appreciated, and the social 
side of strategy is explored. Qualitative 
methods are usually preferred. In spite of this 
methodological, epistemological and 
arguably partial ontological differences with 
positivism, the interpretive culture is still 
influenced by classical science. We saw this 
in analyzing interpretive work, such as the 
interpretive RBV, or work on politics and 
strategy as well as strategy as discourse, 
where authors still strived for lawlike 
theorization. As in classical science, a 
reductive ethos permeates here, and thus, 
research tends to reduce intricate 
phenomena to that which is considered key. 
Classical science’s causality assumptions 
survive in this culture, as it is generally 
assumed that one could explore the causal 
regime of a system by decomposing it to its 
parts (i.e. ontologically atomistic). And so, 
as in classical science, causal arrows keep 
generally pointing downwards, although 
exceptions as always exist. 
A novel although still young and not fully 
developed culture seemed to be emerging. 
This complexity culture breaks away from 
classical science, as it follows complexity 
science instead, which is philosophically 
incompatible with classical science. Here we 
see people trying to understand strategy at 
the systemic level, and thus detaching 
themselves from reductionism. 
Organizations are perceived as complex 
adaptive systems, where the whole is more 
than the sum of the parts. And therefore, 
emergence occurs. Strategy comes to be 
conceived as emergent from bottom-up and 
top-down intricate systemic processes. The 
methodologies of this culture are still 
undefined. Some authors have used 
qualitative approaches, while others have 
used mixed methods. However, an important 
step in leaving classical science behind, 
might be the acceptance of complexity’s 
rejection of causal thinking, as in complex 
systems causal links get lost. 
Table 1. Summary of the three identified cultures of strategic management. In no way these represent an exhaustive or comprehensive categorization, important exceptions exist, 
although these cultures do describe a significant part of strategic management theories.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the history of strategic management is messy and intricate. However, classical 
science’s powerful influence on strategic management’s positivist and interpretive cultures, seems 
to have guided the discipline for a long time now. The influence of classical science on strategic 
management seems to be paradoxical, as it has emerged or is illustrated in even contrasting 
epistemologies, including the positivist and the interpretive traditions of strategic management. 
Due to classical science’s influence on strategic management, lawlike parsimonious reductive 
theories have been constantly looked for by both the positivist and interpretive strategy cultures. 
Sometimes this has derived in an effort to fully describe, predict and/or prescribe our phenomena 
of interest. However, limitations have been identified within both the positivist and interpretive 
cultures of strategic management, which might be related to their embracing of classical science. 
In looking for alternatives, it appears that the alternative ironically comes again from science, as 
their complexity theory appears to be slowly developing a different culture within strategic 
management. As in many other disciplines where complexity has been applied, in strategic 
management too “overall impact and importance of theories based on chaos and complexity is still 
uncertain” (Bryant, 2007, p. 130). Yet, in principle, the emerging complexity culture in strategic 
management seems to start defying reductionism and other limitations of the positivist and 
interpretive cultures and their underpinning classical science ethos. Nonetheless, complexity 
remains a younger alternative in which much more work is needed. And, more importantly, it 
seems evident that the key step of losing “the nostalgia for the lost [classical science] narrative” is 
still to be taken (Lyotard, 1979, p. 41). 
 The tension discussed in this article regarding the various cultures that have evolved in 
strategic management, some heavily influenced by classical science and a new one influenced by 
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complexity theory, is a crucial tension in order to understand the future of strategic management 
as a discipline. For a long time, people have complained that strategic management is fragmented 
in terms of its paradigms. This was clearly shown here, as I discussed a positivist, an interpretive, 
and more recently a complexity cultures (i.e. paradigms) in strategic management. These three 
cultures of strategic management differ on the methodologies they value, the approaches they take, 
and the theories they promote. And therefore, some claim that in strategic management there does 
not exist what Kuhn would call normal science (1996). In his legendary exploration of science, 
Thomas Kuhn observed that between scientific revolutions, a normal science is usually achieved, 
which allows scientists to share common beliefs, methods, approaches, theories and definitions of 
what science is. As Michael Polanyi noted (1946), it is this homogeneity in the beliefs among 
scientists, which allows science to self-organize, as scientists broadly agree on what science is and 
how science should be done (i.e. they basically share a common culture of science). In strategic 
management, it is argued that we have not reached a state of normal science. A situation that, on 
the one hand, causes significant struggles, as people do not agree on what strategic management 
is or how research in strategic management should be done. On the other hand, as the phenomena 
of interest for strategists is considerably more complex than that of physicists and chemists, I 
believe the variety of cultures that characterize strategic management provide great value, so that 
different perspectives and angles could be discussed when approaching our very complex 
phenomenon of interest. Some might say, nonetheless, that for the discipline to develop further 
more homogenization might be required. For which I feel confident the analysis made in this paper 
provides a unique insight. For long people have tried to portray the positivist and the interpretive 
cultures in strategic management as enemies, almost as complete opposites. Yet in this paper I 
have shown that there is something really important that both these cultures share: classical 
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science. In other words, I have shown how both the positivist and interpretive cultures in strategic 
management do share a common significant influence from classical science. This is important, 
because if strategic management is evolving in a Kuhnian way (1996), here we have found one 
step towards what we could call normal strategic management. Of course, as shown in the paper, 
the problem actually is that even as the positivist and the interpretivist have both classical science 
as a common ancestor, this might not be that good, as many of classical science’s beliefs, methods 
and values could be inadequate for strategy. Thus a complexity culture was discussed as slowly 
and recently emerging in strategic management, which could potentially (although not necessarily) 
solve for some of the shortcomings of the classical science inspired positivist and interpretive 
cultures of strategic management. 
 In sum, a possibility has emerged. It could be possible that there is already a Kuhnian 
normal strategic management, which even though on the surface could have contrasting 
expressions (i.e. positivist and interpretive strategic management), at its deepest and most 
foundational level it is clearly supported by a common and almost shared faith on classical science 
and its methods, values, paradigm and ethos. It is that classical science common (shared) core that 
sets the ground for some sort of qua normal strategic management. In this context, many 
shortcomings were evidenced, as classical science was not found to be wholly appropriate for 
strategic management. And it was, then, that an alternative seemed to loom: complexity. A new 
and novel culture in strategic management that would defy the classical science underpinnings of 
both the positivist and the interpretive cultures. In other words, what if, in Kuhnian terms, 
complexity will mark a revolution in strategic management? The latter is, unfortunately, a question 
I cannot answer. Its answer will only come as the future becomes the past, and a new history is 
written.    
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